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Abstract: 
The billionaires of the world attract significant attention from the media and the 
public. The popular press is full of books selling formulas on how to become rich. 
Surprisingly,  only  a  limited  number  of  studies  have  explored  empirically  the 
determinants of extraordinary wealth. Using a large data set we explore whether 
globalization and corruption affect extreme wealth accumulation. We find evidence 
that an increase in globalization increases super-richness. In addition, we also find 
that an increase in corruption leads to an increase in the creation of super fortune. 
This supports the argument that in kleptocracies large sums are transferred into 
the hands of a small group of individuals.  
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The billionaires of the world attract significant attention from both the media and the 
public, with some billionaires generating a celebrity stardom. The richest person on earth 
for more than a decade, William Gates III, is constantly in the media. If we search for 
“Bill Gates”, a Google search generates 27 million hits.  This is five times as many as if 
we search for “Robert De Niro” who is seen as one of the greatest actors of his time (see 
http://www.imdb.com). The popular press is also full of books that sell formulas how to 
become rich. For example, looking at recent releases through Amazon we can find titles 
such as “Think Like a Billionaire, Become a Billionaire”, “Millionaire in 365 Days: The 
Daily Plan to Get There”, “Be a Real Estate Millionaire: Secret Strategies to Lifetime 
Wealth Today”, or simple how “How To Become a Millionaire”. Moreover, positional 
concerns due to relative judgments are common. Neumayer (2004, p. 793) stresses that 
the  “accumulation  of  great  fortunes  creates  uneasiness,  envy  and  concern  in  many 
people”. People seemed to constantly compare themselves with their environment and 
care greatly about their relative position, which influences individual choices. Thus, not 
only is the absolute level of an individual’s situation important (e.g., income), but also the 
relative position. Frank (1999) emphasizes that research provides “compelling evidence 
that concern about relative position is a deep-rooted and ineradicable element in human 
nature” (p. 145). Relative changes may also induce envy in all different environments. 
Friedman (1962) referred to the following example in the academic world: “The college 
professor whose colleague wins a sweepstake will envy him but is unlikely to bear him 
any malice or to feel unjustly treated. Let the colleague receive a trivial raise that makes   3 
his salary higher than the professor’s own, and the professor is far more likely to feel 
aggrieved. After all, the goddess of chance, as of justice, is blind. The salary raise was 
deliberate judgment of relative merit” (p. 166, cited in McAdams, 1992, p. 103).  
  Surprisingly,  only  a  limited  number  of  studies  have  explored  empirically  the 
determinants of extraordinary wealth. It seems that Neumayer’s (2004) study was the first 
one  that  explored  the  issue  at  the  global  level  using  a  cross-sectional  analysis.  As  a 
dependent variable the study used the number of billionaires in each country (working 
with the Forbes list.) The results show a positive and statistical significant correlation for 
GDP per capita and population size. Thus, it is easier to accumulate great wealth in richer 
and more populous countries. The study also shows that the protection of property rights 
is positively correlated with extraordinary wealth, but in the two reported estimations the 
coefficient was only statistically significant at the 10% level. Morck, Strangeland, and 
Yeung (1998) find that economic growth depends on who owns the physical capital and 
not just on the stock of physical capital itself. They observe a correlation between lower 
rates of economic growth and entrenched family control of a nation’s capital. On the 
other hand, entrepreneur billionaire’s control of capital is correlated with faster rates of 
economic growth. Other studies have more a local perspective. Goldman (1998) explores 
why Russian businessmen appeared for the first time in the 1990s in the Forbes list even 
while Russia’s president Boris  Yeltsin  and its Prime  Minister Sergei  Kiriyenko  were 
seeking a $20 billion IMF loan. Studies by John J. Siegfried and his co-authors discuss 
how, where and why fortune in different countries arose from different industries looking 
at Australia (Siegfried and Round 1994), US (Blitz and Siegfried 1992), UK (Siegfried 
and  Roberts  1991),  New  Zealand  (Hazledine  and  Siegfried  1998).  Kennickell  (2003)   4 
investigates wealth development in the US. Looking at two lists, (one of them the Forbes 
data on the 400 wealthiest Americans), the author concludes that wealth grew relatively 
strongly at the very top of the distribution together with the share of total household 
wealth held by the listed names in the Forbes’ list.  Similarly, looking at the Forbes 400 
richest list in the US between 1982 and 2002 Kopczuk and Saez (2004) also find a strong 
wealth gain for those wealthy individuals with concentration within the top 100 and in the 
years of the stock market bubble of the late 1990s.  
In  this  paper  we  use  an  international  perspective  to  explore  the  relationship 
between globalization, corruption and extraordinary wealth. We work with the Forbes list 
of billionaires using a panel of 8 years between 1996 and 2003. The results indicate that 
individuals  in  more  globalized  countries  are  better  able  to  accumulate  extraordinary 
wealth. However, we also find that there is a positive relationship between an increase in 
corruption and an increase in extraordinary wealth.  
 
II.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
1. Data Sets and Hypotheses 
Using the Forbes list of billionaires
1 as a dependent variable, we develop  a panel of 8 
years between 1996 and 2003. We stress th at the international environment  facing a 
country might be a key factor to understanding extreme wealth accumulation. Countries’ 
capacity  to  act  globally  by  creating  international  networks  guarantees  the  flow  of 
                                                   
1 Based on country of citizenship and not residency. For a description of the methodology see 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/05/billionaire-methodology-acknowledgements-billionaires08-
cx_lk_0305thanks.html   5 
information, goods and capital, thereby increasing the possibility set for super-rich people 
and  reducing  restrictions  to  act  more  efficiently.  Thus,  we  would  predict  a  positive 
correlation  between  an  increase  in  globalization  and  an  increase  in  extreme  wealth 
accumulation.  Moreover,  more  globalized  environments  are  correlated  with  a  higher 
degree  of  competitiveness  and  a  lower  level  of  protection  against  competitors  from 
foreign countries which should not hinder the creation of super fortune (Neumayer 2004). 
To investigate this question we will work with an interesting data set provided by Dreher 
(2006) that (contrary to other studies) provides an overall measure of globalization that 
covers several dimensions of globalization based on 23 variables. 
  In addition, we explore the correlation between corruption and super richness. In a 
state  where  corruption  is  rampant,  the  allocation  of  resources  is  distributed  in  a 
discretionary and unequal manner. Long-term relationships with a few firms might be 
established to share nation’s wealth at the expense of ordinary people (Rose-Ackerman 
1999). Thus, in kleptocracies wealth is often transferred into the hands of a small group 
of  individuals.  For  example,  Levin  and  Satarov  (2000),  e.g.,  analyze  corruption  and 
institutions in Russia, and raise the criticism that corruption is an integral part of Russia’s 
economy.  They  state  that  the  degree  of  corruption  exceeds  the  total  expenditures  on 
science, education, health care, culture, and art. In some industries, criminal groups spend 
up to 50% of their revenues to bribe officials (p. 115). Goldman (1998) stresses that 
Russia is a unique case where various oligarchs accumulated their wealth in a short time. 
A large proportion of the biggest banks were linked to organized crime. For example, 
former  deputy  minister  of  the  petroleum  industry  Vagit  Alekperov  ended  up  owning 
much of the industry he had previously supervised. Thus, Goldman (1998) concludes that   6 
the Russian case was based on expropriation of what was formerly state property and not 
due to the creation of new productive entities. We would therefore predict that a higher 
level of corruption may lead to more extraordinary wealth accumulation. First, we use the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that provides yearly data (see Knack 1999) on 
corruption. The corruption variable assesses the corruption within the political system. 
Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" 
and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" 
in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, police protection, or loans". To check the robustness we are also going to use 
the “control of corruption” variable available in the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2003) data set covering the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
  In another robustness check we will also use the control of corruption variable 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003). The proxy measure is driven by the traditional 
notion of corruption namely “the exercise of public power for private gain” covering a 
variety of aspects ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done” 
to the effects on the business environment (p. 8). The values lie between –2.5 and 2.5, 
with higher scores corresponding to a lower level of corruption. 
  In line with Neumayer (2004) we control for the economic development (GDP per 
capita) and the population size of a country. The idea is that a larger population size 
allows for a larger number of super rich people compared to smaller population size. In 
addition,  a  higher  GDP  goes  in  line  with  a  better  infrastructure  (physical  and 
organizational) and better access to higher social and human capital. Moreover, it has 
been argued that it might be easier to accumulate greater wealth in an economy where   7 
people are wealthier (Neumayer 2004). We therefore collect that information from the 
World Development Indicators.  
 
2.  Specification of the Test Equation 
To test our two hypotheses, we propose the following baseline equation:  
 
NBIit =   +  1 CTRLit + 2 GLOBit + 3 CORRit+  TDt +REGIONi +  it    (1) 
 
where i indexes the countries in the sample, NBIit denotes countries’ billionaires  over the 
periods 1996 to 2003.  GLOBit is our index for globalization and  CORRit the level of 
corruption  (higher  values,  lower  corruption).  The  regressions  also  contain  two  key 
control variables, CTRLi, namely GDP per capita and the population size. To control for 
time as well as regional invariant factors, we include fixed time, TDt, and fixed regional 
effects,  REGIONi
2.  it  denotes  the  error  term
3. We report three models, namely FE 
regressions, left censored tobit models due to a large amount of zeros in the data set,  and 
probit models where 1 measures whether a country has at least one billiona ire. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, we also report the marginal effects of the probit 
estimations instead of  only the estimated probit coefficients so that we can discuss not 
only the direction of the effects but also their sizes. The estimated probit coefficients are 
based on a non-linear estimation technique and cannot be interpreted readily in terms of 
                                                   
2 We differentiate between Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, the 
Pacific, Asia, the Caribbean and Australia. 
3 For an overview of the countries and summary statistics see Appendix Table A1 and Table A2.    8 
the quantitative sizes of the effects. Other independent variables are held at their mean 
when computing the marginal effects for a particular independent variable. 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the results. In the first three specifications we only explore the impact of 
GLOB  on  NBI,  controlling  for  time  and  regional  fixed  effects.  As  can  be  seen  the 
coefficient GLOB is always statistically significant at the 1% level. An increase of the 
globalization  index  by  one  unit  increases  the  number  of  billionaires  by  more  than  3 
people. Specification [3] also shows that an increase in the globalization index by one 
unit is correlated with an increase in the number of billionaires by 37%. Thus, the effect 
is  not  at  all negligible.  Moreover, these simple specifications  explain almost  40% of 
variance in NBI.  
  In the next three regressions we add CORR together with the two CTRL variables. 
First, we use the ICRG data set to measure the lack of corruption (see [4] to [6]). The 
negative  coefficients  indicate  that  a  decrease  in  corruption  leads  to  an  increase  in 
extraordinary wealth. In all three regressions the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 1 or 5% level. Specification [4] shows that on average a one unit increase in CORR 
reduces the number of billionaires by 1.2 and specification [5] indicates that such an 
increase reduces the probability of generating a billionaire by 7%. The effect of GLOB 
decreases after extending the specification but the quantitative effect is still relatively 
strong. The idea of the next three specifications ([7] to [9]) is to check the robustness of 
the  relationship  between  CORR  and  NBI.  We  therefore  use  an  alternative  proxy  for 
CORR, namely the Kaufmann et al. variable “control of corruption”. It should be noted   9 
that higher values are related to a lower corruption level, and also that the number of 
observations decreases as we move from 8 to 4 years of country data. Table 1 reports that 
the previously received results remain robust. Both, GLOB and CORR are statistically 
significant reporting even larger quantitative effects. Thus, we can conclude that our two 
hypotheses cannot be rejected.  
  Looking at the control variables we find (in line with our predictions) that the 
population size as well as the GDP per capita is positively correlated with NBI. As a 
further robustness check we also run probit regressions with standard errors adjustments 
where we cluster at the country level. The obtained findings lead to the same conclusions. 
We also explore how government interventions or economic freedom affect super wealth. 
We therefore use the Economic Freedom of the World  data base from 2000 to 2003 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2006). We use the size of government index as first variable 
(GOV). It covers: general  government consumption spending as a percentage of total 
consumption, transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, government enterprises and 
investments as a share of total investment, and top marginal tax rate. These components 
indicate the extent to which countries rely on the political process to allocate resources 
and goods and services (…..). Such interventions may prevent the generation of super 
wealth. The results show a negative correlation between GOV and NBI. Thus, an increase 
in economic freedom is positively correlated with the accumulation of extreme wealth. 
However, the coefficient is only statistically significant in one out of 6 regressions (t- or 
z-values between 1.43 and 1.92). Thus, we cannot state that government size matters. 
Neumayer (2004) finds a similar result working with the US Heritage Foundation’s Index 
of Economic Freedom.    10 
Table 1: Determinants of Extreme Wealth (NBI) 
Explanatory variables  FE  RE Tobit 
(left 
censored) 
Probit  FE  RE Tobit (left 
censored) 




   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9] 
GLOB (globalization index)   3.465***  19.352***  1.275***  2.640**  8.038***  0.702***  3.074**  10.163***  0.745*** 
(5.33)  (10.85)  (12.85)  (2.48)  (3.05)  (4.72)  (2.35)  (2.92)  (3.44) 
    0.370      0.222      0.204 
                   
CORR (lack of corruption)        -1.180**  -3.379***  -0.225***       
ICRG        (-2.40)  (-3.15)  (-3.50)       
            -0.071       
                   
CORR (control of corruption)              -1.994*  -7.515***  -0.333** 
Kaufmann et al.               (-1.82)  (-2.68)  (-1.98) 
                  -0.091 
                   
CTRL: log (GDP per capita)        1.354***  9.805***  0.517***  1.722**  11.692***  0.618*** 
        (2.20)  (5.58)  (5.81)  (2.09)  (4.65)  (4.29) 
            0.164      0.169 
                   
CTRL: population size        1.07e-08***     3.74e-08 ***    1.53e-09***  1.03e-08 ***    4.85e-10***  1.85e-09***    
        (3.44)  (6.12)  (4.67)  (2.73)  (4.85)  (3.96) 
            4.85e-10      5.08e-10             
                   
Regional fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2/ Pseudo R
2  0.381    0.346  0.394    0.369  0.401    0.373 
Prob > F/ Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
# of observations  976  976  912  875   875  820  473  473  445 
Notes: t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The probit regressions 




Moreover, the picture does not change when we focus on alternative proxies such as 
regulatory  restraints  that  limit  the  freedom  of  exchange  in  credit,  labor,  and  product 
markets (REG) or the legal structure and security of property rights (LEG).  
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has studied the effect of globalization and corruption on the generation of 
extraordinary wealth. Although the media and the popular press is full of discussions on 
how  to  become  rich,  we  only  find  limited  amount  of  studies  that  have  explored 
empirically the determinants of extraordinary wealth. What we do find in the literature 
besides the literature discussed in the introduction is, for example, the discussion of the 
phenomenon of superstars. Rosen’s (1981) seminal paper has initiated a lively discussion 
about stardom and salary structure – stressing that in many professions a relatively small 
number  of  people  boast  prodigious  salaries  and  dominate  the  field.  Since  then,  the 
superstar effect has been investigated not only in the economics of sports, but also in the 
entertainment  industry,  such  as  Hollywood  economics  (De  Vany  2004),  cultural 
economics (Frey 2000) and in winner-take-all markets, where a small heterogeneity in 
performance translates into large reward differences (Frank and Cook 1995). Our results 
indicate  that  globalization  enhances  super-richness.  Countries’  capacity  to  create 
international  networks  guaranteeing  the  freedom  to  exchange  information,  goods  and 
capital  seems  to  be  a  key  ingredient  in  enhancing  the  accumulation  of  extraordinary 
wealth. However, this positive relation to the creation of new productive entities is only 




generated  through  corrupt  activities.  We  find  that  a  higher  level  of  corruption  is 
correlated with  super-richness.  It  seems  that in corrupt environments, wealth is  often 
transferred into the hand of a small group of individuals. For example, experiences in 
Russia  and  Indonesia  (under  Suharto)  have  shown  that  a  number  of  assets  in  the 
privatizations and expropriation process were transferred to “insiders” of the system in 
place.  As  Goldman  (1998,  p.  15)  stresses,  these  people  are  not  “Andrew  Carnegies, 
Henry Fords, Bill Gates’ or even John D. Rockefellers”.  
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Table A1: Countries (122 countries, based on specification [1]) 
Albania  Germany  Nigeria 
Algeria  Ghana  Norway 
Argentina  Greece  Oman 
Australia  Guatemala  Pakistan 
Austria  Guinea-Bissau  Panama 
Bahamas  Guyana  Papua New Guinea 
Bahrain  Haiti  Paraguay 
Bangladesh  Honduras  Peru 
Barbados  Hong Kong  Philippines 
Belgium  Hungary  Poland 
Belize  Iceland  Portugal 
Benin  India  Romania 
Bolivia  Indonesia  Russian Federation 
Botswana  Iran  Rwanda 
Brazil  Ireland  Senegal 
Bulgaria  Israel  Sierra Leone 
Burundi  Italy  Singapore 
Cameroon  Jamaica  Slovakia 
Canada  Japan  Slovenia 
Central African Republic  Jordan  South Africa 
Chad  Kenya  Spain 
Chile  South Korea  Sri Lanka 
China  Kuwait  Sweden 
Colombia  Latvia  Switzerland 
Congo, Republic of  Lithuania  SYRIA 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of 
the 
Luxembourg  Tanzania, United Republic of 
Costa Rica  Madagascar  Thailand 
Cote D'Ivoire  Malawi  Togo 
Croatia  Malaysia  Trinidad and Tobago 
Cyprus  Mali  Tunisia 
Czech Republic  Malta  Turkey 
Denmark  Mauritius  Uganda 
Dominican Republic  Mexico  Ukraine 
Ecuador  Morocco  United Arab Emirates 
Egypt  Myanmar  United Kingdom 
El Salvador  Namibia  United States 
Estonia  Nepal  Uruguay 
Fiji  Netherlands  Venezuela 
Finland  New Zealand  Zambia 
France  Nicaragua  Zimbabwe 







Table A2: Descriptive Statistics (Key Variables) 
 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
NBI  2558  1.167  9.638  0  269 
GLOB  976  2.323  0.982  0.722  5.420 
CORR (ICRG)  1098  2.944  1.263  0  6 
CORR (Kaufmann et al.)  719  -1.48E-10  0.997909  -2.050  2.583 
CTRL: log(gdp per capita)  1447  7.530  1.575  4.085  10.751 
CTRL: population size  1575  6.09E+07  4.42E+08  0.769  6.29E+09 
   
     